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December 2007


Economic Perspective Updated—December 4, 2007

Despite the current market turmoil, can recession be avoided
and will stocks continue to advance?

Since our last comment in early October, financial markets have swooned. The S&P 500 registered an official "correction" of 10% the Monday after Thanksgiving after having hit an all time high on October 10th (two days before we posted our last Economic Perspective). The bond market has similarly demonstrated signs of uneasiness as investors have driven yields on Treasuries to recession-like lows in a flight to quality, while investment grade and high-yield bond yields have both widened substantially in response to higher perceived risk. Only in the past several days has the stock market been able to mount a rally, although the yields on bonds have suggested continued investor fear.

On September 18th the Federal Reserve lowered the Fed Funds and Discount rates by 50 basis points. There is one event that seems to have prompted the beginning of a reversal in the optimism following this reduction in both the Fed Funds rate and the Discount Rate. That event was news that a group of global banks, including Citigroup, J.P. Morgan and Bank of America, in coordination with the U.S. Treasury Department, was attempting to structure a bailout of an important portion of the nearly $400 billion in various types of asset-backed securities held by about 40 Special Investment Vehicles (SIV's) that had been created over the previous half decade. The announcement was vague, and indicated that the finalization of the plan would take some time. While the bailout was clearly intended to address a problem and thereby reassure markets, in fact it seems to have raised suspicions that things were worse than expected and that the recent Fed easing might not be as effective as first thought.

What really took stocks down was the Federal Reserve's October 31st "Halloween" surprise, a 25 basis point reduction in Fed Funds and the Discount Rate, in line with most expectations, but accompanied by comments that made it evident that the Fed believed no further rate reductions were likely needed. Their press release stated that they believed the risks between slower growth on the one hand, and higher inflation on the other, were now "balanced." Over the next few weeks, public comments by Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents reiterated the message that further rate cuts were unlikely because they were not needed.

The markets clearly disagreed. Supporting the market's perception, subsequent to the Fed's rate cut, was a steady stream of data suggesting softness, if not deterioration, in the domestic economy, accompanied by almost daily news announcements of continued and potentially worsening problems in the domestic and global credit markets. Increased daily stock price volatility, lower stock prices, and widening credit spreads suggested that investors were beginning to behave in anticipation of a possible recession in the United States, and were becoming increasingly skeptical that global growth would be enough to prevent a global recession. In essence, the markets and the Fed were locked in a very dangerous game of "chicken." The Federal Reserve was taking the stand that financial excesses would have to be worked out by the markets, while the markets were giving the Fed a preview of what such a market "workout" would look and feel like.

The Fed blinked first. On the same day that the Dow and S&P 500 registered a 10% or greater decline from their previous highs, the Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Donald Cohn, in response to questions following a speech, signaled the Fed's increasing recognition of the rising distress in financial markets and the risks that it created for the domestic economy. Similar statements by Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, followed Cohn's comments two days later. Over that three-day period, the S&P 500 advanced almost 4.5%, and has continued to edge up modestly since then. At the same time, the odds of a rate cut at the upcoming December 11th FOMC meeting, as measured by activity in the interest rate futures market, increased dramatically, with some commentators beginning to raise the possibility of a 50 basis point reduction rather than just a measured 25 basis points that was the best hope of the extreme optimists only a week before.

The underlying cause of these recent volatile market movements, as well as those experienced in February and, especially August, is uncertainty over the economic consequences from the ongoing deterioration of the domestic housing market, and the continuing turmoil in the credit markets as a result of the huge number of sub-prime mortgages of uncertain or declining value still held in investor portfolios throughout the world. These factors are beginning to undermine confidence in the real economy; consumers are becoming cautious in their spending, and businesses are becoming wary of new hiring and additional capital spending. The credit markets themselves are faltering; there are signs that banks are reluctant to lend to each other, as well as, increasingly, to consumers and businesses, regardless of what interest rates can be charged. The issuance of new bonds has remained anemic, even among top-flight borrowers. What is particularly alarming is that, despite the fact that central banks in the United States, Europe and Japan have injected hundreds of billions of dollars of liquidity into the global banking system in an attempt to encourage the banks to extend credit, banks have tightened lending standards and have only extended credit begrudgingly relative to most normal environments.

At the same time, a host of remedial efforts are being implemented or suggested from both the private and public sectors. Citigroup, the bank with the largest exposure to SIV's, was able to raise $7.5 billion in fresh capital by issuing an 11% convertible preferred bond to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority in exchange for a passive, 4.9% interest. Morgan Stanley just purchased 11,000 homes from Lennar Corporation for $525 million, clearly a speculation but at the discounted average price of $47,000 per house. On a larger and public scale, the U.S. Treasury, as noted before, is helping to coordinate a structure to take pressure off banks with particularly large exposure to off-balance sheet investment vehicles they created in the past. The head of the FDIC has proposed a plan to freeze interest rates on the mortgages of sub prime borrowers who have good prospects of maintaining their loans at current rates but who are least able to survive scheduled upward resets in rates, and thus, monthly payments. Those who have the least ability to handle their loans as they currently sit, however, may be excluded from the plan, on the basis that they are over their heads even under the current loan terms and should probably never have gotten a mortgage to begin with. Borrowers with sufficient wherewithal to handle the upticks in rates also would be excluded. And, as noted also, the Federal Reserve has made borrowing by banks easy and has increasingly suggested its willingness to cut short-term interest rates in the near future.

It is clear that the risks of a recession have increased substantially over the past few months, and we believe that that the workout in the housing and credit markets will be drawn out and hazardous. However, it is still our contention that recession can be avoided and that stocks should continue their advance once that becomes clear. The more quickly and dramatically the Federal Reserve responds on the rate front, the more quickly can the economy, and the stock market, get back on a growth track.

The views expressed in this article are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions, and should not be construed as a recommendation. This article contains forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date they were made and involve risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed herein. Readers are cautioned not to rely on our forward-looking statements.

 
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